This paper challenges the notion that on-the-job training investments are quantitatively important for workers' welfare and argues that on-the-job training may not increase lifetime income by more than one percent. In particular, I argue that it is very difficult to reconcile the slowdown in wage growth late in a worker's career with optimizing behavior unless the technology for learning on the job is such that it generates very low gains from training. The analysis is based on a non-parametric methodology for estimating the learning technology from wage profiles; the results are arrived at by comparing the lifetime income when the worker optimally invests in his human capital to the one when he does not make any investments at all.
Introduction
Following the pioneering work of Becker, the analysis of human capital accumulation has played an increasingly important role in economics. Where and how human capital is accumulated has become an important question. The workplace is one place where workers learn and become more productive and OJT (on-the-job training) is one activity thought to be quantitatively important for human capital accumulation. In this paper, I develop a nonparametric methodology to estimate the net gains in lifetime income from on-the-job training investments using wage data. Following the human capital theory, I assume that the key factor in wage growth is OJT and interpret the wage data using a dynamic human capital investment model. The strategy is to derive the technology of learning on the job using wage data and use the derived technology to compare the lifetime income when the worker optimally invests in his human capital to the one when he does not make any training investments at all.
The application of my methodology using NLSY data reveals a striking result: the implied increase in lifetime income from training is less than one percent. The key qualification to this finding has to do with wage growth late in a worker's life, which is unavailable in the NLSY. However, CPS data, which unlike the NLSY does not follow individuals over time but does contain wages also for older workers, suggest that wage growth late in life is negligible: using cross sections of a given cohort at different years as well as a cross section of different cohorts in a given year, CPS shows zero wage growth late in life. Zero wage growth late in life, therefore, is the maintained hypothesis in my analysis. If, contrary to these observations, there were significant wage growth later in life, the implied contribution of OJT to lifetime income would be more than one percent. I therefore repeat the same analysis hypothesizing alternative wage profiles later in life. This exercise generates a range of returns and helps explain which features of the wage data imply that individuals gain a lot from training investments. In addition, taking into account the contribution of other factors to wage growth such as matching and incentive contracts, which is abstracted in the analysis, would imply a number less than one percent.
Even though some data on training are available and several studies have used them, training data are acceptedly very imperfect. 1 Data on informal company training are missing in many data sets. Therefore, another contribution of this methodology is to help draw reasonable inference using wage data when data on the amount of time spent in training are not available.
In order to quantitatively evaluate OJT, I extend a standard human capital investment model by Ben Porath (1967) . Markets are competitive. Therefore, workers are paid their marginal products. Workers allocate their time between producing output and on-the-job training.
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The cost of training is forgone earnings and the return is the increase in future earnings power. Since the main concern of this paper is to evaluate human capital investment on the job, I abstract from other features that may cause wage growth rather than on-thejob training and interpret all wage growth over the life cycle as a result of human capital investment on the job. This gives an upper bound on the importance of on-the-job training for the lifetime incomes of workers. In Kuruscu (2004) , I argue that human capital investment on the job would be less important for the lifetime income of workers if other factors were causing the observed wage growth.
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To understand the intuition behind my results, consider the case when wage growth stops after 20-25 years of work experience. In this case, as I will argue, it is very difficult to reconcile the slowdown in wage growth late in a worker's career with optimizing behavior unless the technology for learning on the job is such that it generates very low gains from learning.
First, I analyze the wage data and the assumption of rational investment in training and reach the conclusion that the marginal return and the marginal cost of an additional unit of 1 See Brown (1989), Lynch (1992) , and Lillard and Tan (1992) for papers which use training data to estimate gains from training.
2 On-the-job training does not only refer to formal company training. Any costly learning activity on the job can be considered as on-the-job training. Learning-by-doing is also similar to on-the-job training to the extent that workers have to pay for high learning jobs through taking lower wages initially (See Rosen (1972) ).
However, learning-by-doing may not exactly reduce to on-the-job training. The job with the least learning-bydoing may have some learning in it. In that case, as long as the worker is employed, some part of learning is unavoidable and comes freely (see Killingsworth (1982) ). For more discussion why these two learning activities should be treated separately, see Cossa, Heckman, and Lochner (1999). 3 Other factors include matching and incentive contracts.
investment are both quite insensitive to the level of investment at any point in time. The arguments behind this go as follows. The marginal return to investment is the present value of future increases in earnings. Assume that depreciation of human capital is zero. Then, one unit increase in human capital leads to one unit increase in earnings each period until the end of working life.
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Also assume that investment today does not affect future costs of training.
Then, the marginal return to a unit of investment is the present value of a constant stream of dollars. The marginal return declines over time, because the number of periods a worker can enjoy benefits of the investment declines by age. In the early years of one's life, the dollar in the last working year adds very little to that present value due to discounting. One year later, the marginal return to a unit of investment falls very little because only the dollar in the last year of working life drops out of the present value calculation. As life progresses, however, the dollar in the last year becomes more important (is discounted by less). Thus, the present value return to on-the-job training investment falls more slowly earlier in life than it does later.
With regard to wages, they grow faster early on in the worker's career; after about 20 years, wage growth is negligible. This implies that on-the-job training decreases faster with age at younger ages and stops after 20 years assuming zero depreciation. A small decline in marginal revenue can only be consistent with a large early decline in investment if the marginal cost is also insensitive to the level of investment; that is, the marginal cost curve-like the marginal revenue curve-is very flat.
Second, the increase in lifetime income from training is the total revenue minus total cost which is the summation of (MR-MC)*(amount of investment) from zero to optimal investment level; in other words, it is the area between the marginal cost and the marginal revenue curve.
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Since both the marginal return and cost are insensitive to the level of investment-MR is very close to MC also for all levels of investment-the result is a number close to zero. The result that marginal cost is very close to marginal revenue over the range of investment choices is key, and it is mainly driven by the fact that the wage growth after 20-25 years is negligible. 4 In the analysis, I assume that the depreciation rate of human capital is zero. This assumption is consistent with the estimates reported by Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999). In Kuruscu (2004) I discuss and explain how results would be affected if the depreciation rate were assumed to be positive. 5 I assume that there is no fixed cost of investment.
As will be analyzed later, when wage growth continues until the end of one's working life, the implied gain in lifetime income is much larger.
Some studies have evaluated benefits of on-the-job training using data on training. Brown (1989), Lynch (1992) , and Lillard and Tan (1992) show that training has a significant positive effect on wages. These results provide evidence for the human capital interpretation of wage growth. Mincer (1991) calculates rates of return from training investments using the estimates reported in some of these studies. He reports rates of return between 15% and 20% which are much higher than 7% return for schooling and any measure of the interest rate. Given that the interest rate is much lower than the rate of return to on-the-job training that Mincer reports, his numbers imply that on-the-job training increases lifetime income significantly.
The main result of this paper is strongly at odds with these findings. Possible explanations for the larger estimates in this literature include lack of appropriate control for selection bias and underreporting of informal company training.
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Papers that use Ben-Porath model or its versions include Heckman (1974 Heckman ( ,1976 papers, my paper is more focused on one issue-the value of OJT-whereas in the other papers OJT appears in a less central way and without a specific discussion as to its overall relevance.
In section 2, I describe the model economy. Section 3 illustrates the methodology for retrieving the technology of human capital production from wage data without using functional forms and applies the method to different wage profiles. Section 4 concludes. 6 To the extent that more able persons are more likely to receive training and/or employers provide training to those who have more ability, the estimated coefficients on the effect of training on wages will be biased upwards. A second potential problem is that informal company training is generally underreported. Since the cost of training is likely to be underestimated in this case, rates of return reported by these studies are likely to be biased upwards.
The Model
The intuition behind the main results of the paper and the logic of the methodology can be understood by a generalization of the Ben Porath (1967) human capital investment model.
Workers live/work for T periods. Each worker provides one unit of time inelastically in each period that can be allocated between the production of output and the production of human capital on the job, i.e., on-the-job training. Therefore, the actual earnings of the worker is given by h s (1 − i s ). In this case, the cost of training is equal to foregone earnings, h s i s .
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The law of motion for the human capital of an s-year-experienced worker is
where δ is the depreciation rate of human capital. Q s is the addition to human capital due to the investment in period s and is a function of time allocated to on-the-job training and the human capital of the worker:
Workers are risk neutral and maximize the discounted value of their earnings stream. I abstract from the consumption-savings decision because the income maximization and utility maximization problem of a worker can be separated under complete markets without borrowing 7 The estimates of labor supply elasticities based on annual data are quite small. See Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999). 8 In this formulation, the only cost of training is the opportunity cost of a worker's time. This assumption is not crucial however. In Kuruscu (2004) I show that if training had other costs in addition to the opportunity cost of time, these costs could be represented as part of the time cost.
constraints. In Kuruscu (2004) , I discuss how the model's implications would change if workers are borrowing constrained. In particular, I argue that, to the extent that OJT generates wage growth, borrowing constraints cannot be significant for training investments. Let r be the interest rate. Then, the problem of an s-year-experienced worker is given by
is the wage earnings and it is denoted by w s in the rest of the paper. It is also the hourly wage rate in this model because labor supply is inelastic. In the methodology below, I
use the hourly wage rate from the data to retrieve the technology of human capital investment because the hourly wage rate reflects the productivity of the worker.
3 Interpreting Wage Data Using the Model
The Methodology
In this section, I show how to derive the technology of human capital production from wage profiles in the data without using any functional form assumptions. However, since the production function f (h s , i s ) is very general, it cannot be identified from wage profiles without imposing more restrictions on the technology. Therefore, I assume that the production function is given by
This assumption corresponds to the neutrality assumption in the human capital literature. It states that human capital increases equally the productivity of time in the marketplace and in the production of further human capital. The previous literature also assumes thatf takes the Cobb-Douglas form. Assume that δ is zero. This assumption is consistent with the estimates reported in Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999).
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Notice that h s i s is the total cost of training.
is the cost of adding Q s units of human capital to the capital stock.
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Using this transformation, the problem of an s-year-old worker can be rewritten as
The optimal amount of investment, denoted by Q * s , is given by
The left hand side is the marginal cost (M C), and the right hand side is the marginal revenue (M R s ) of adding a unit of investment to the capital stock of the s-year-old worker. Then, using the following envelope condition,
M R s can be computed as
As equation (1) suggests, the marginal return to investment is simply the discounted flow of future increases in earnings power and it does not depend on the level of investment.
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As can be seen in equation (1), one can compute the value of M R s for each s for a given interest rate. Therefore, the important step in the analysis is to derive the M C curve. I assume that there is no fixed cost of investment. Then, one can compute the increase in 
Then, the wage growth between s and s + 1 years of experience is given by 
C(Q
Using the piecewise linear approximation to the marginal cost curve illustrated in Figure 1 ,
) can be approximated as the following:
It is important to note here that an assumption behind this expression is that the cost function is "smooth" (i.e. the cost function can be approximated with a linear form for small changes in investment). Therefore, one can approximate wage growth as
Using this equation, Q * s can be found for all s. Notice that the wage and the M R s are known for each s and that Q * T = 0. The investment in the last period of life is zero since investment has no benefit. Therefore, equation (2) 
Technology and Lifetime Income
The next step in the analysis is to understand what type of technology would give high or small net gains from on-the-job training. The shaded areas in Figure 2 illustrate the increase in lifetime income due to on-the-job training for two different technologies. As can be seen, the shaded area is much smaller for Technology I compared to that for Technology II. Therefore, Technology I implies much smaller gains from training. 
An Application and the Intuition
To apply the procedure developed in the previous sections, I need full lifecycle wage profiles.
However, no data set follows individuals for 40-45 years. In the working-paper version of this 13 One should note that both technologies have convex cost curves. The drawback of the CPS data is that it is not a panel. Therefore, I use the NLSY in the present paper. However, since the NLSY does not contain data for later years in life, I use CPS data as a guideline and assume as a benchmark that wage growth is zero after 20 years of experience. Following a certain cohort using repeated cross sections of the CPS also reveals that there is no significant wage growth after 20 years and supports this assumption. Later, I
repeat the analysis hypothesizing alternative wage profiles for later years.
The benchmark analysis is conducted using the wage profile in Figure 3 . The dashed line is the average hourly wages from NLSY data for men who have high school degree or less and who are not self-employed. 14 I fit a smooth wage profile to this wage data assuming that there is no substantial wage growth after 20-25 years of working life. Figure 4 illustrates wage growth over the lifecycle. As can be seen in Figure 4 , wage growth declines faster earlier in life. As the worker gets older, the decline in wage growth gets smaller.
After 15-20 years of working life, wage growth is negligible. Figure 5 illustrates the variation in marginal revenue from on-the-job training investment over the life cycle. The marginal revenue declines over time, but it declines more slowly early on in life due to the length of the worker's remaining lifetime. As the worker gets older, the 14 Wage profiles for those who have more than a high school degree also give similar results. However, the data for this group is four years shorter since they enter job market for about four years later. 
The numerator is the present value of gains from training in all periods. The denominator is lifetime income without any training. Recall that h 0 is the potential earnings of the worker at the beginning of his career. Since, the marginal revenue curve shifts down with aging,
The equation above suggests that it is sufficient to show that the gain from training in period zero, ∆Y 0 , is small compared to the worker's potential earnings in period zero, h 0 . For this purpose, write
The technology in Figure 8 implies that
is small. Note that
is the fraction of time allocated to training in period zero and is less than one since wages are positive.
Therefore, the gain from training is much less than the potential earnings of the worker in period zero. In this particular example, the lifetime income when the worker optimally invests in his human capital is only 0.71% higher than the one when he does not make any investments at all.
Wage growth over the life cycle, w T − w 0 = h T − h 0 + C(Q * 0 ), has two components: 1) the increase in human capital and 2) the decline in the cost of investment. Some of the wage growth is due to the decline in the cost of training because workers receive less training as they get older. When the M C curve is as in Figure 8 , the area under the M C and hence the cost of training is large. In this case, most of the growth in wages over the life cycle is due to decrease in the cost of training investment. In this particular example, 70% of the wage growth is due to decline in the cost of investment while 30% is due to increase in human capital.
Alternative Wage Profiles
Cross sectional data reveal that wage profiles are flat in later years. Therefore, I regard this case as my benchmark. In this section, I will explain how the result would change if wage growth continued further. Therefore, I perform the same analysis as in the previous section assuming different wage profiles after the data ends. This exercise generates a range of returns and clarifies an important message: observing high level of wage growth by itself does not imply that OJT increases lifetime income significantly. The timing of wage growth is the key. In fact, the value of OJT is greater for those who experience larger wage growth later in life.
Consider the four wage profiles in Figure 9 . Wage profile 1 is analyzed in the previous The following table gives the percentage increase (∆Y /Y ) in lifetime income from OJT for these four wage profiles for different interest rates. In the benchmark analysis, I assume that the interest rate is 5%. Then, the increase in lifetime income is 0.71% for wage profile 1, 4.08% for wage profile 2, 3.86% for wage profile 3, and 8.13% for wage profile 4. The lower the interest rate, the higher is the increase in lifetime income. 15 However, the main conclusion of the paper-the result that OJT does not significantly increase lifetime income unless there is significant wage growth later in life-does not change. Some important observations are the following:
1. Even though wage profiles 1 and 3 have the same level of wage growth over the life cycle, 15 The reader may refer to Kuruscu (2004) each year). This implies that the M C curves for these two wage profiles should be similar.
Therefore, the implied gain in lifetime income for wage profiles 2 and 3 are not very different. Figure 10 illustrates that the M C curve implied by wage profile 2 is slightly to the right of the M C curve implied by wage profile 3 but that they are very close.
Why does wage profile 4 imply much larger increase in lifetime income than wage profile 2?
Notice that wage profile 4 diverges from wage profile 2 after 15 years of experience. Therefore, wage growth in wage profile 4 is much larger in later years. This implies that the M C curve that generates wage profile 4 should be to the very right of the M C curve that generates wage profile 3. Figure 10 confirms that. Therefore, the increase in lifetime income implied by wage profile 4 is larger than that of implied by wage profile 2.
The key message from this analysis is that workers who experience wage growth in later years of working life are the ones whose learning technology generates large benefits from training. Wage growth, even if large, in early years does not imply that training increases lifetime income significantly. If wage growth slows down significantly after 20 years, this would imply that the technology of learning on the job is such that the M C curve is very steep around zero investment level and, therefore, training does not increase lifetime income significantly.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a methodology to estimate the net gains in lifetime income from training using wage data. A novel feature of this method is that it helps draw inferences about the value of training investments when we do not have data on actual time devoted to on-the-job training.
The methodology reveals that workers who experience wage growth in later years of their life are the ones who gain a lot from training. Wage growth in early years does not necessarily imply that training increases lifetime income significantly. Therefore, to the extent that wages flatten in later years of life-which is the case for many workers and which is suggested by cross sectional data-this paper questions the notion that OJT is important for workers.
There are some important assumptions that makes the methodology in this paper feasible.
The first assumption, which is very standard, is that workers are paid their marginal products.
Therefore, wage profiles reflect productivity profiles over the life cycle. The second assumption is that skills are general. This is also necessary for wages to reflect productivity. In Kuruscu (2004), I discuss these issues more in detail.
